Friday, June 12, 2009

What should be done with Kim Jong Il? Nothing.

The ambitious, intelligent and persuasive global arms industry should be extremely excited with the challenges or “follies” (what else to call them?) of Kim Jong Il, the North-Korean dictator.

In abstract terms, the client adored by the arms industry is fear. Without it, there would be generalized insolvency in the cannon industry. Even worse than General Motors. On the other hand, the client respected in flesh and blood is any head of state or government sufficiently unscrupulous or courageous in resolving the problems of their country (principally those of an economic nature) by avoiding them through emotional saber-rattling.

This is exactly the case of Kim Jong Il, the son of another dictator and likely the father of a third. This will only not happen if his son refuses the post. If this occurs, another family member will probably be proclaimed “king”. A strange case of royalty, of blue blood (or, in this instance, yellow) in a type of regime whose very essence (communism) resides in the closest kind of identification between leaders and led. Given that, in North Korea, there is no free press or free elections, the masses - lean, but not by choice - support the orders handed down by their irrevocable “father”, without further analysis.

Considering that there is not even a shadow of democracy in North Korea and that its future (and that of the whole region) depends on just one man, and this depends on that which occurs in his mind, the best solution regarding the Korean nuclear threat lies in patiently awaiting a biological decision to be made. In the case in question, concerning his health. After he is gone, we will see what needs to be done. Attack North Korea? Only if the country attacks first, and in a concrete manner. This means without even considering so-called “preventive attacks’, which would have extremely serious consequences in terms of destruction, deaths and radioactive contamination.

Given that world government, or some semblance of such government, does not yet exist (this is something that needs to be changed as a matter of urgency), with powers, accepted by all countries, of immediate intervention for “confiscation” or “extraction” (as in the case of a rotten tooth) of dictators who are putting various other countries at risk, and even those who are under their domination (as in the case of Robert Mugabe, in Zimbabwe), the wisest solution is not to encourage the warmongering of a head of state who may not be in full control of his mental faculties for physical (stroke) or psychological reasons.

In the 1930s, if Hitler (after arming Germany with the largest war machine ever seen - externalizing his intention to dominate the world) had been “extracted” from power by a democratic world government, we would not have had the widespread slaughter that was the Second World War. Not even its consequence, the so-called “Cold War”, which nearly became transformed into an atomically “hot” war in 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. This did not result in nuclear conflict solely because Nikita Khrushchev, a simple-minded man (on one occasion, in the middle of a UN session, he removed a shoe and began hammering it on the table, demanding attention), but a man of great vision, had the good sense and moral courage to make an about-turn, ordering the return of ships that were transporting nuclear missiles destined for Cuba.

In fact, this gesture of courageous prudence, which saved humanity from a war that was likely to be nuclear, did not save the prestige of Khrushchev within the Soviet Union. Russian generals thought that he was “soft” in dealing with the incident. Instead of being thankful for not being incinerated, the star-studded and medal-bedecked generals criticized the retreat. They did not understand the reach of this heroic gesture precisely because it was not “heroic”, i.e., accompanied by the beat of drums. As a result, Khrushchev lost his hold on power in his country. With the return of the missiles, international headlines remained fully focused on John Kennedy. This is just another example that “taking a hard-line standpoint” is of “greater value” to the masses than acting in an intelligent and discerning manner. Being fully aware of this, dictators generally rely on shows of force - and it is the people who end up being hurt. Just as in the case of the Falklands, a small-scale war destined to distract attention from the problems that afflicted Argentina at the time.

Any kind of military measures - “other options” - against Kim Jong Il, with a view to bringing his nuclear activities to a halt or destroying them would be counterproductive. Such military measures are unthinkable, given that North Korea has a numerous and powerful army. In addition, in an extreme situation, it could launch missiles with nuclear warheads. That would lead to chaos. There is no guarantee that the country would be flattened before pressing the launch buttons. Even if this occurred, following a sudden and precise attack by the USA, such a preventive attack would be an act of cowardice against a population that cannot be blamed for the foolishness of its head of government, the “master” and architect of public opinion. In a land where there is no freedom of the press, few think differently from their leader.

Besides this, “hard-line economic sanctions” also do not function, as they augment the poverty of countries governed by dictators if such leaders are, rightly or wrongly, supported by the populace. It is only the poorest sectors of society that suffer. There will be no lack of food and other indispensible goods on the table of those in government and their supporters. And when hunger is a threat, there is an increase in the proportion of “friends of the ruler”, whose interest is that of getting enough to eat, this being a primary drive embedded in all living beings. A lack of food in the stomach can have immense persuasive force.

However, an irrefutable argument that reinforces popular support for Kim Jong Il has a factual basis: there is currently unequal treatment among countries. The UN Security Council requires that North Korea interrupt its nuclear program destined for arms production. The problem is that, for this to occur, it would have to maintain inspectors within its nuclear facilities, constantly checking whether the activities in question are solely being developed for peaceful purposes. This is very irritating for the country being inspected.

I doubt (a normal reaction) that Israel would allow international inspectors, with Arab surnames, to scrutinize its nuclear installations. However, the five permanent members of the aforementioned Security Council (USA, United Kingdom, Russia, China and France) are free to have as many nuclear arms as they wish. Together, they could destroy the Earth many times over. Besides the five permanent members, India, Pakistan and Israel also have their nuclear arsenals, without any opposition on the part of the Security Council. What is the conclusion drawn by the North Koreans (the same applies in the case of Iranians) as a result of this evident inequality? Are the North Koreans in some way “inferior” or congenitally imbalanced? In theory, is it not the case that all countries have equal rights?

An article entitled “Que tal a velha diplomacia?” (Bush’s Best Example), by Norman Dombey, Emeritus Professor of Theoretical Physics at Sussex University, Great Britain, published in “The Guardian” and reproduced, in Portuguese, in the “O Estado de S. Paulo” newspaper on 31-5-09, in the supplement entitled “Aliás”, J5, specifies the breaking of several promises made by the George W. Bush government to Kim Jong Il, resulting in retaliation on the part of the dictator. The aggressiveness ingrained in Bush by the well known “hawks” that surrounded him made a significant contribution to the exaggerated reactions of the North Korean president, someone already exaggerated in nature. He concluded that it was no longer possible to trust the Americans. Thence the conclusion drawn by the aforementioned author of the article that the Obama administration “blundered into sanctions and threats”. For reasons of space, it is not possible to transcribe all the arguments put forward in the article, but these can be read in the publication in question. Well worth the effort.

Another article, in the same Brazilian newspaper, dated June 1st 2009, on page A12 (this time by Seumas Milne, previously published in “The Guardian”), under the title of “Hipocrisia estimula proliferação” (Hypocrisy encourages proliferation), also draws conclusions regarding hypocrisy and double standards in the international field, allowing some countries to fabricate nuclear weapons and prohibiting others. In other words, the permanent members of the UN Security Council and a few “allies” (Israel, India and Pakistan) have the “right to have fear”. On the other hand, North Korea and Iran have no such right. How is it possible to explain this inequality, without “shame”, in a world that reaffirms the existence of something that does not exist, i.e., equality? The explanation lies in the title of the aforementioned article: “Hypocrisy”.

Nuclear weapons states are generally more respected than those not attributed with equal powers. This is a factor that also motivates Kim Jong Il. Given that the USA invaded Iraq, based solely on “mistrust” (in fact, just another pretext) regarding the existence of weapons of mass destruction, and Bush broke agreements and confronted the UN, Kim considered it safer to emphasize, through a loud-speaker, that his country was really in possession of nuclear power, albeit incipient. Apparently, Kim is afraid and knows that enemies of countries with nuclear arsenals think more carefully before attacking.

Clearly, the more widespread nuclear proliferation, the greater the danger for all mankind. Proliferation should be avoided at all costs, but nota t the cost of a war that could become nuclear. It would be a case of contradicting purposes.

Innumerous more prudent countries are not bothered, diplomatically, by this inequality. For example, Sweden, which already has the technology necessary for construction of atomic weapons, has explicitly decided not to construct them. Perhaps knowing that, as it stands, the country will not become the target of mistrust and hostilities. Brazil, which could construct such arms within a few years, has also preferred to follow a more peaceful path, if only due to the fact that it does not feel threatened. If atomic energy were to be developed for military rather than peaceful purposes, such a move would likely lead to rivalry on the part of Argentina. On the other hand, North Korea and Iran could argue that they indeed consider themselves to be in potential imminent danger, if they continue to be “weaker” than their neighbors. Hence the union of fear and arrogance and, in the case of Iran, the need to impress the electorate.

Summing up: what should be done in order to resolve the current impasse? The reply to this question seems simple: Obama and his allies work, diplomatically, with a view to gaining the confidence of North Korea, Iran and Israel, with the urgent signing of a treaty guaranteeing that none of these three countries will be attacked, unless they are considered to be evident aggressors by a majority decision by the UN Security Council, without any right to veto in this case. A treaty without conditions and without inspections of any nature whatsoever.

In the meantime, considering the current state of the world, there is no way of impeding nuclear proliferation, the fruit of fear and/or arrogance. Nevertheless, with the exception of some kind of insanity, no country, of whatever kind, is going to want to initiate a nuclear war, which would also end up incinerating the actual aggressor. Once such a treaty has been signed by Obama, North Korea would have more confidence in “pieces of paper”. In all certainty, the new American president would not be subject to demoralization, for example, coming to be known as an “international trickster” or even a “sluggard”.

With peace ensured, albeit in a provisory manner, the world will be at leisure to deal with other matters. Such “other matters” will have to include the establishment of a new world order, more effective than that which currently exists. The immediate total abolition of nuclear arms is an illusion. The USA is fearful of the growing power of China, and vice-versa. Israel is fearful of Iran, and vice-versa. Even if all countries were to sign a treaty eliminating their nuclear arsenals, there would be no guarantee that a few warheads would not remain hidden, “just in case”. However, a new world order, which definitively resolves the matter, is a topic that cannot be dealt with here.

(2-6-09)